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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN LEACH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
NORMA B. ANDERSON and 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. ) 
Case No. 13808 
DEFENDANT'S AND RESPONDENT'S, 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY'S, 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
I - PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Valley Bank and Trust Company, a Defendant and Respondent, move 
the Court for an Order clarifying its decision of May 29, 1975, or for 
rehearing. 
II - INTRODUCTION 
The decision as set forth creates considerable confusion in the trust 
law of the State of Utah and for administrators of Trusts and it would be of 
considerable assistance to those involved in the administration of Trusts if 
the rehearing were granted and the opinion clarified so as to avoid problems 
and conform the law. 
Ill - THE RULING OF THE COURT 
IN RELATION TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
IS CONFUSING AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH PRIOR COURT DECISIONS 
It is conceded in this case by the Court and all parties that the 
applicable statute of limitations is contained in 70A-12-26 Utah Code Annotated, 
Subsection k9 which provides that an action must be instituted within three 
years after a liability created by the statute of the state comes into being. 
In this case, in accordance with the findings of the District 
Court, the irrevocable Trust Agreement was adopted on November 12, 1968, 
Finding No. 5, and that "directly after the creation of the Trust the title 
to the real property was transferred to the name of the nominee of the 
Trustee11 (Finding No. 12). 
The obligation to the Plaintiff was created approximately a year 
later, April 15, 1969. 
The lower Court found that there was no fraud and that Mrs. 
Anderson made no representations whatsoever to the Plaintiff and that he had 
no right to rely upon the financial statements of the Plaintiff (Conclusions 
of Law No. 1 and 2). 
The thing that the Court sets aside is the Trust. Since the Trust 
is created in 19685, the date of its creation has to be the controlling date 
in relation to the running of the statute of limitations that gives the 
right to set aside the Trust* 
This was not a secret Trust. Notices were available to any inquiring 
creditor and deeds recorded. 
Since the thing being set aside as to this creditor is the Trust, 
then the statute of limitations must run from the date of the creation of 
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the Trust. The Court should not confuse this case with the case of actual 
fraud for if there had been representations of financial solvency or owner-
ship of property, then the statute could run from the date of the discovery 
of the fraudulent representations. In this case there are no fraudulent 
representations. The Court has found that there are none. 
To use the analogy that Subsection k of the three year statute 
of limitations should be similarly applied as to Subsection 2 which involves 
theft of personal property or Subsection 3 which involves fraud is to read 
into Subsection k the following wording which is contained in Subsection 
(2) and (3): 
M
... the cause shall not be deemed to have accrued until the 
owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a reason-
able man on inquiry..oH 
H(3)..o the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed td 
have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of t|ie 
facts constituting the fraud or mistake." 
There is no similar wording in Subsection *f and, therefore, by any 
application of rules of construction the Legislature did not intend the 
application of Subsection k to be tol led unti 1 there was ''discovery by the 
agreed parties18. 
Trusts continue for many years, sometimes through two and three 
generations being limited only by the rule against perpetuities. 
It is apparent that the Legislature intended that an action to 
set aside a Trust, which action is commenced under a specific statutory 
authority and is a derivation of the common law, must be commenced within 
three years; otherwise, the Trust would be valid and enforceable in all of 
its particulars. 
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The case of Smith v. Edwards, Supreme Court of Utah, December 31> 
1932, 17 P 2d 264, considered fraudulent conveyances which is certainly 
an analogous or similar matter to that presently before the Court. That 
case has many similarities with the present case for in the Smith case the 
indebtedness was not contracted for more than two years after the conveyances 
were placed of record (Page 268). In the present case the debt is contracted 
a year after the conveyances are placed of record and the Trust created. In 
the 5mith case the Court held nfrom the t|me of recording of these conveyances... 
the Plaintiffs and ajl pther persons had notice of such conveyances..fH 
In the Sm^th case the Cpurt noted that "oq inquiry of any nature seems to have 
been made...11 (P^ge 271) an<* in the present case the Court found that Mr. 
Leach had made no Inqijlfy of any nature. The similarities between these 
two cases are many foldf On Page 272 the Court said that the ''question is 
not fhe financial CPncJ|fion so long after the transfers but the financial 
condition at t\\e time of the transfers'1. |n the present case at the |ime 
of the transfer Mrs, Anderson had already (divested herself of the ownership 
of the trust assets and notice thereof had been placed of record and the 
Plaintiff had made no inquiry in relation to the assetp. 
The Court, on Page 272, states: 
"We are of the opinion that the action is barred under the 
statute of limitations for the reason that discovery was made, or 
the situation was such as to furnish full opportunity for the 
discovery of fraud, if any existed, more than three years before 
the bringing of the action. We are further of the opinion there 
was no fraud shown..." 
The opinion of the Court seems to consider that there was fraud 
in this case for in the decision it is said: 
- k -
MThe situation is analogous [to fraud per sejand the same 
principal appliesH 
The Court assumed facts not in evidence as a reason for failing 
to consider and rule as to whether or not the Plaintiff was entitled to 
real estate or proceeds of real estate placed in trust. 
There is a financial sheet that pre-dates by a substantial time 
the creation of the Trust and the present date which states that the 
Anderson Enterprises stock was valued at $l*t5,000. 
There is no evidence as to the value of that stock or any of the 
personal property that was transferred to the trust estate. 
In fact, although not in evidence, the Anderson Enterprises stock 
is of questionable value and may be completely valueless. Your Petitioner 
should not bring into this matter evidence that is not in the case below, 
but, on the other hand, the Court must limit its decision to the facts 
presented below and there were no facts in the lower Court to indicate the 
value of the personal property that was placed into the Trust. There was 
substantial evidence as to the value of the real estate placed in Trust. 
Therefore, the final paragraph of the Decision should be eliminated or 
modified so as not to create confusion in the law or to base this decision 
on facts not in evidence. 
IV - CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Court should be revised to either determine 
that the cause of action of the Plaintiff is barred by the three-year statute 
of limitations or to otherwise rationalize the ruling without effecting 
judicial legislation. 
- 5 -. 
This case without further clarification makes unsure all existing 
trusts and puts the administrators thereof in jeopardy, all to the detriment 
of the citizens of the State and the administration of trust processes. 
Therefore, the decision should be clarified or expanded so as to give definitive 
rules to the draftsman and the trust administrator so that the problerp created 
by this case can be avoided in future cases. 
This Court has many times said it would avoid judicial legislation 
and leave to the legislators the modification of the statutes and the 
declarations of public policy. Therefore, this decision should be modified 
so that either the Court candidly assumes the responsibility for judicial 
legislation and inserts in Subsection (k) of 70A-12-26 UCA the words *'but 
the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until 
the discovery by the aggrieved party11 or the decision should be modifjed to 
determine that this case is barred by the statute of limitations of the State 
of Utah. 
7 
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ju iify j.ii«'h allowances (here should be be-
fore the court such a record as would estab-
lish at least a probability of her succeeding 
in the iinal disposition of the case. 
Had the allegations of her unfitness to en-
ter into the marriage covenant been untrue, it 
would have been a simple mailer to have de-
nied them ami to have supported such denials* 
It is therefore ordered that the temporary 
writ heretofore issued be made periininu; 
upon the record as it now stands. 
STRAUP, ELI AS HANSEN, TOLLAND 
and EWIIIAIM HANSON, JJ., concur. 
CHERRY, 0 . J., did not participate herein, 
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.rue. whoii./ detcut either tueir or her right 
to allowances out of the estate of the de-
ceased. Under such conditions we do not 
think it a sullicient answer to say that they 
are entitled to allowances as a condition 
precedent to their being required to answer. 
y\\l-\y:.?. c.^j^rl l}:.2t V:JC^T t i e j.5ivr as 
!.".*>, 124 N. (*;. 804, Kathryne fly rue would 
not have been entitled to an allowance in 
any event for the reason that alimony and 
counsel fees can be allowed only during cov-
erture and that the right ceases with death. 
But the allowance for the support of the 
claimed widow was not made by the district 
court in the nature of alimony. It was made 
in the administration of the estate under the 
statute providing for family support. If i t 
should be finally established that the par-
ties were in fact husband and wife, then it 
necessarily follows that the allowance is prop-
er. 
But the allowance for attorney's fees and 
suit money must rest on a different basis. As 
pointed out in the Farnham Case, the right 
to suit money and counsel fees in actions af-
fecting the marriage relations cease with 
death. The rights of the parties after the 
death of one spouse depend upon the law ap-
plicable to the administration of estates. 
Neither statute nor decisions have been called 
to the attention of the court, and the writer 
has been unable to discover any, providing 
that where a person is attempting to estab-
lish his or her right to participate in the dis-
tribution of an estate, that the sinews of war 
should be furnished by or from the estate. In 
the Farnham Case; it is clearly pointed out 
that where such a contest as this is before 
tlie court, the opposing parties are not ob-
o & i / n u t i 1. Vi,£DY« 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 31, 1932. 
I. Fraudulent conveyances €=»74(3). 
CoDTevarjce without consideration !? *V% 
against creditors, though grantor is Iar?*;j 
indebted (Laws 1925, c. 42, § 2, subd. 1). 
Conveyance is not necessarily fraudu-
lent because it is made without consider-
ation and while grantor is indebted in 
large amounts of money, for grantor may 
still have ample resources to pay all of 
such amounts and all other indebtedness 
existing at time of conveyance or matur-
ing thereafter. Laws 1925, c. 42, § 2, 
subd. 1, defines person as being insolvent 
when present fair salable value of his as-
sets is less than amount required to pay 
his probable liability on his existing debts 
as they mature. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Voluntary," see Words and Phrases.] 
2. Pleading <£»8(I5). 
Allegation that grantor remains in pos-
session after conveying land is fact allegation 
and may or may not prove fraud against 
creditors (Laws 1925, c. 42). 
3. Pleading <£=>8(I5). 
Allegation that grantor received rents, 
issues, and profits of property after its con-
veyance is fact allegation and may or may 
not establish fraud against creditors (Laws 
1925, c. 42). 
4. Pleading C=*8(I5). 
Allegation that, by conveying lands, gran-
tor became insolvent, is mere conclusion, and, 
ligated to furnish suit money nor counsel fees to establish fraud against creditors, must be 
to the woman who is attempting to estab-
lish her marital status. In like manner the 
<*t;uio siLOulcUv*. protected.from•\K*XU% <teplet«-
• i u . 
No question is raised as to the right of the 
court to issue a writ of prohibition under the 
facts of this case. We therefore refrain 
irvm* c*cr~S'i'ic*xxii£ it* 
amplified by supporting facts, though un at-
tacked by demurrer or motion (Laws !&£, t 
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Millies ns tboy mature, and also by alle-
gation of what fair salable value of his 
property is, and that such present fair 
salable value is less than amount that will 
be required to pay his existing debts, 
specifying their amounts, and when they 
will mature. 
5. Fraudulent conveyances <S==>6. 
So far as cause of action involves mat-
ters occurring prior to Fraudulent Convey-
ances Act, act is inoperative (Laws 1025, c. 
42). 
6. Fraudulent conveyances <S=»263(I). 
Provisions of Fraudulent Conveyances 
Act are in harmony with general law respect-
ing necessity of specifically pleading facts 
constituting fraud (Laws 1925, c. 42). 
7. Fraudulent conveyances <§=>263(l), 2 9 5 ( 0 . 
Where there is fair or valuable consid-
eration, allegations and proof of fraud 
against creditors must be more specific than 
where no consideration passed (Laws 1925, 
c. 42). 
8. Fraudulent conveyances <3=>263(4), 301(1). 
Where grantees are using property and 
paying taxes pursuant to recorded deeds, 
plaintiffs seeking to set aside conveyances be-
cause defrauding creditors must allege and 
prove that grantees misled plaintiffs (Comp. 
Laws 1917, § 4900; Laws 1925, c. 42). 
Aside from question of consideration, 
plaintiffs must allege and prove that, as 
grantees, grantees did certain acts which 
misled plaintiffs, or held themselves out in 
a way that misled plaintiffs and that 
plaintiffs had knowledge and relied there-
on. Comp. Laws 1917, § 49)00, provides 
that every conveyance from time of filing 
for record, shall impart notice to all per-
sons of contents thereof. 
9. Fraudulent conveyances <§=^63(l), 295(1). 
Creditor whose claim arisqs after record-
ing of conveyance which he seeks Jo set 
aside as fraudulent, must allege ancj prove 
that ho was misled by pvert act into believ-
ing something different; fronj what record 
showed (Popip, Laws J917, f 4900; Laws 
1925, o, 42). 
10. Fraudulent conveyances <3=»27l(2). 
In action to set aside conveyances as de-
frauding creditors, plaintiffs alleging that 
credit was extended oil knowledge thai gran-
tor owned conveyed property, had burden of 
showing their information (Coyip. Lawp 1917, 
§ 4900; Laws J025, c. 42). 
Plaintiffs ajleged tfeat credit was ex-
tended on knowledge $nd belief that gran-
tor was qwncr of conveyed property, and, 
if this were true, pijph knowledge, in so 
far as either allegation or prpof was con-
corned, must have been obtained from 
source Qtjier than tfcaj of grantor qr $ran-
:I'WARDS Utah 2 6 5 
<a«i> 
tees, and only other sources of informa-
tion as to title to property would be rec-
ords of conveyances in county recorder's 
ofliec, or sonic interested or disinterested 
third persons, it appearing further that 
deeds were recorded soon after their exe-
cution, and that about six months after 
their recording, grantor moved from con-
veyed lands arid grantees were thereafter 
in occupation and use of property. 
11. Fraudulent conveyances <©=»77. 
If fair consideration is given, creditors 
may not attack conveyance because of gran-
tor's insolvency (Laws 1925, c. 42, § 3). 
Laws 1925, c. 42, § 3, declares that fair 
consideration is given when in exchange 
for property, or obligation, as fair equiv-
alent therefor, and in good faith, prop-
erty is conveyed or antecedent debt is 
satisfied, or when such property or obliga-
tion is received in good faith to secure 
present advance or antecedent debt in 
amount not disproportionately small as 
compared with value of property or obli-
gation obtained. 
12. Limitation of actions <&=>100(1). 
Respecting time of discovering fraud 
against creditors within limitation statute, 
where recorded conveyances indicate fair con-
sideration, all persons may rely thereon until 
acquiring information sufficient to put rea-
sonably prudent person on inquiry (Comp. 
Laws 1917, §§ 4900, 6408, subd. 4 ; Laws 1925, 
c. 42, § 3). 
Comp. Laws 1917, § 64G8, subd. 4, pro-
vides that action for relief on ground of 
fraud or mistake may be brought within 
three years, and that cause of action is 
not to be deemed to have accrued until ag-
grieved party discovers facts constituting 
fraud or mistake. 
13, (.imitation of actions <§==>! 00(13). 
Jtespecting time of discovering fraud 
agaipst creditors, where recorded conveyanc-
es s^ted consideration as $1 and other valu-
able considerations, statute ran from time 
whop reasonably prudent person would have 
inquired and discovered falsity, if any (Comp. 
Lawg 1917, §§ 4900, 64(38, subd. 4). 
14, pecords <§=>I9. 
statute providing that conveyance filed 
for record imparts notjee to all persons held 
intended to constitute notice without rcfer-
cpeQ to place of residence or otherwise (Comp. 
La\ys 1917, § 4900). 
15, fraudulent conveyances G=>29l(l). 
fphat testimony respecting wages con-
tained discrepancies ip amounts would not 
just|fy disallowing entjre amount. 
Such discrepancies, would not justify 
disallowance of entire amount, unjess 
c$ijrt was of opinion that there wa^ no 
@=>For other cases fee same topic an4 KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexes 
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veyed to their son, Lawrence Edwards, also a 
defendant, by warranty deed, two tracts of 
land aggregating about (»G acres generally re. 
ferred to in the evidence as tracts R and V. 
On the 8th day of December, 1020, a deed 
passed between the same parties of like im-
port for two additional tracts of land desig-
nated D and E. On the Oth day of December, 
1920, the defendant George II. Edwards and 
his wife conveyed to their son, Elmer Ed-
wards, four tracts of land aggregating about 
58 acres, and referred to by exhibits and evi-
dence as tracts F, G, H, and I. The stated 
consideration in each of the deeds is "for tin; 
sum of one dollar and other good and valua-
ble considerations.*' In addition to the stat-
ed consideration in the granting and consid-
eration clauses, in the body of the deeds to 
Elmer, two of the tracts, G and I, are each 
stated to be "subject to a mortgage of $1,000.-
00 which the grantee assumes and agrees to 
pay as part of the consideration." All of 
these deeds were duly filed for record in tbe 
county recorder's office of Wasatch county, 
Utah, on December 23, 1920. There was also 
a deed of conveyance from George II. Ed-
wards and his wife to Lawrence Edwards 
bearing date the 13th day of January, 1019, 
and referring to a t ract of land designated in 
the evidence and exhibits as tract A. This 
deed was recorded on the 14th day of Jan-
uary, 1919, in the office of the recorder of 
Wasatch county, Utah. The trial court found 
and decided that the conveyance relating to 
tract A "was not fraudulent and the same is 
valid as against any claim of the plaintiffs or 
intervenor," and no question as to tract A is 
presented upon this appeal. (D. H. Wenger, 
trustee, is sometimes referred to as plaintiff 
• and sometimes as intervener.) 
. . JXhe object of the proceeding is to get aside. 
Appeal from. District Court, Wasatch Conn- the conveyances and subject the property Jo 
ty ; A. V. Wafkins, Judge.
 t h e c l a l m s 0f creditors; As disclosed by the 
Action by Albert H. Smith and others evidence aside from the claims and interests 
against George H. Edwards and others, and equities of any parties to this proceeding, 
Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants ap- there are interests and equities of other par-
peal, ties not parties hereto that would involve 
Reversed, and remanded with directions. m u c h litigation to determine, if the judgment 
• of the trial court is to stand. Nearly if not 
Robinson & Robinson an<J A. B. Morgan,
 a l l 0f t h e p r operty was, subsequent to the 
all of Provo, for appellants, conveyances, and long prior to the fringing 
H. O. Allen, and E. R. Chrjstensen, boflj of of this actiop, mortgaged by ' the grantees 
Salt Lake City, and Abe Turner, of Prqvo, which mortgages were, in most instances, still 
contract for wages, or (lint, on a quantum 
meruit, t lie re was nothing duo. 
16. Fraudulent conveyances C^>76(l). 
If wages owed by father to son, plus 
amounts subsequently paid by son to father 
for lands, failed of fair consideration, court 
should have set aside conveyances as defraud-
ing creditors and imposed, lien for amount 
paid bona lide (Laws 1025, c. 12, § 3). 
17. Fraudulent conveyances <©=>327. 
In equity proceeding, such as action to 
set aside conveyances as defrauding credi-
tors, Supreme Court may review law and 
fact questions. 
18. Appeal and error <§=>I009(I). 
In equity proceeding, judge's fact find-
ings should stand unless Supreme Court is 
convinced of error.* 
19. Fraudulent conveyances <§=>57(4). 
In action to set aside conveyances as de-
frauding creditors, question is grantor's 
financial condition at time of conveyances, 
not many years afterward (Laws 1925, c. 42). 
20. Limitation of actions <S=>!00(11). 
Action over 7 years after conveyances 
were made and recorded, to set aside convey-
ances as defrauding creditors, held barred; 
there being opportunity for discovering fraud, 
if any, over 3 years before suing (Comp. Laws 
1917, §§ 4900, G4C8, subd. 4 ; Laws 1925, c. 42). 
21. Fraudulent conveyances <©=>295(I). 
Evidence held insufficient to warrant get-
ting aside conveyances as defrauding credi-
tors (Comp. Laws 1917, § 4900; Laws 1Q25, 
C. 42, § 3, and | 2, subej. 1). 
for respondents. 
MOFFAT, district Judge. 
The defendants are the appellants. !fbe 
plaintiffs (ire the respondents. We shall gfen-
eraUy refey tq them as plaintiffs and defend-
ants, specifying them, by name or otherwise 
when necessary. 
0 n the 6tb day of December, 1920, the fle-
fcndant George H. Edwards apd his wife opp-
l » * ' •"""•' '"* mm "• < • m m * * 
* Paxton v. J»**:ton (U|ah) 16 P.(2d) 105L 
unpaid at the time of the trial of the cause. 
The allegations of the complaint are of a 
general character. In response to the charge 
of the defendant that the complaint is de-
fective in that it contains no allegation with 
respect to actual or constructive fraud and 
that no facts are pleaded from whioji actual 
or constructive fraud can be inferred, the 
plaintiffs (respondents) in summary of the 
allegations ot their complaint state; "There 
can be founoj * * * the allegation that 
the conveyance was voluntary, w^s made 
$=»Fof Q\\LQT casein see same topic and KJpIY DUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexe* 
mmmm m* «Ni • •M i l PT^ssraEirar i-:r^ "i . ?«- - j i * « f t e * a i * i j « i * * a 
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with fhc fraudulent purpose and inient of de-
'frauding the creditors of said (icorge II. Kd-
-.vanls, and especially these plaintiffs, in 
\. h Is fraudulent intent and purpose the said 
,;.', *;dant (naming the grantee in that par-
. ; r <}ord) participated. * * * That 
,..•. i, and all of said conveyances was made 
, M] recorded without consideration and while 
;•.„. said defendant (Soorgo II. Edwards was 
indebted in large amounts of money * * * 
, ftl all were made for the purpose of placing 
nd properly beyond the reach of his cred-
iiors, and the same were made as a part of 
•i (tin-piracy and scheme of the said defend-
,i : ; <;eorge II. Kdwnrds, Lawrence Edwards 
i d I'lhner Kdwards to defeat the just claims 
«.f the creditors of said grantor, and ever 
,iii<f the same were made the said Grantor 
lias continued to have and use the said lands, 
Utah 2G7 
pose may be inferred, and without stating 
the facts constituting the scheme amount to 
no more than saying the conveyances were 
fraudulent. To allege the holding of land in 
secret trust for another is alleging no more 
than that the land is being held fraudulently. 
The allegation that a grantor remains in pos-
session of land after its conveyance is an alle-
gation of fact, and such fact may or may 
not prove fraud. The allegation that one 
receives the rents, issues, and profits of prop-
erty after its conveyance is an allegation of 
fact, and, if proved, may or may not support 
a charge of fraud. The allegation that "by 
reason of said conveyances the grantor ren-
dered himself unable to pay his debts or be-
came insolvent" without specifying the 
amounts, values, parties, or circumstances are 
conclusions and to be available for the pur-
id enjoy the rents, income and profits there- pose of supporting proof must be amplified by 
urn, and the said defendants Lawrence Ed- alleging facts sufficient to support the sum-
uanls and Elmer Edwards have always, and 
do now hold the said titles to said parcels of 
land in secret trust for the defendant George 
11. Kdwards." and particularly paragraph 13 
K fHains an allegation of insolvency. 
Paragraph 13 reads: "That by reason of 
marized conclusion, even if not attacked by 
demurrer or motion. 
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 
Laws of Utah 1925, c. 42, defines, among oth-
er things, "Insolvent person." This statute 
is not only a declaration of the law of this 
whl conveyances the said George H. Edwards state now, but is a fair declaration of what 
rendered himself unable to pay his creditors constitutes an insolvent person under gener-
without resorting to said lands.'' 
Paragraph 10 of the complaint not referred 
to by counsel for plaintiffs contains the fol-
lowing statement: "That unless said convey-
ances are set aside the said defendant George 
11, Edwards is and will be wholly insolvent, 
am! that plaintiffs are without any adequate 
ivaiedy in the ordinary course of law." 
Counsel for plaintiffs then add: "Nothing 
INMJV could be added which would make a 
snore forcible and complete allegation of 
triad, and facts constituting fraud in these 
conveyances." 
!tj Stripped of its tautology it may well be 
dfulticd whether the alleged allegations of 
tii«» complaint amount to more than saying, 
*h. conveyances were voluntary and fraudu-
lent. A conveyance without consideration is 
voluntary, hut not for that reason alone 
fraudulent. That a conveyance was made 
v. Idle one is indebted "in large amounts of 
amaey" is not necessarily fraudulent; but 
cfaihiued with other facts and circumstances, 
May he. Neither is a conveyance necessarily 
fraudulent because it is made without can-
deration and while one is indebted iq large 
.ni.Mints of money. One may still Have 
ample resources to pay all of the "large 
aaanmts of money" and all otjier indebfcc}-
;» s if such should exist at the time of nwjc-
in.' the conveyance, or as they mature, 
ally accepted authority. Section 2, subd. 1, 
reads: VA person is insolvent when the pres-
ent fair salable value of his assets is less 
than the amount that will be required to pay 
his probable liability on his existing debts as 
they become absolute and matured." 
To allege that a person is "insolvent" is al-
leging a pure conclusion. Under the statute 
such a statement must be amplified by allega-
tions of fact as to the amount of money re-
quired to pay his probable existing liabilities 
as they mature, also by an allegation of what 
the fair salable value of his property is, and 
that such "present fair salable value is less 
than the amount that will be required to pay" 
his existing debts specifying the amounts, 
and when they will mature. 
To the complaint the defendants interposed 
both a general and a special demurrer. Both 
were overruled, and error is assigned there-
for, The general demurrer is not argued 
though much might be said in support of the 
general demurrer. 
[5, 61 The defendants pontend that the com-
plaint is uncertain and unintelligible in that 
it cannot be ascertained; or determined from 
the allegations of the complaint, what acts of 
fraud the defendants ha$ been guilty of with 
respect to the transfers in question. The 
learned judge of the triqj court in overruling 
defendants' demurrer m&de reference to the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, supra, 
:2 4} The allegations that the conveyances passed in 1925, indicating that because of the 
^ r.> made for the purpose qf placing tfcfl act the complaint was sufficient. The convey-
'••r.-;vriy beyond the reach of creditors aiwj ances sought to be set qsjde had been macje 
y• re made as a part of a scheme, withou^ in 1020, about five yearn before the passage 
iU' statement qf facts from which the pty|i of the act and more ttyjn seven years bp 
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fore the nelion was brought. Tt is nsserled, 
however, that I lie alleged fraud was not dis-
covered until 102G, or about a year after the 
passage of the act. In so far as the cause of 
action related to matters occurring prior to 
the act, the act would have no effect. Where-
in the act is merely declaratory of what the 
law was at the time of the conveyance, it 
would make no difference. rJJhp provisions of 
the act are in harmony with the general'law" 
""""o 11 11 Ie s 11bj e<11. 
* 27 C. J. 772: "In the absence of some spe-
cific statutory provision, the rule is that the 
facts upon which fraud is predicated must be 
specifically pleaded. A mere general aver-
ment of fraud is nothing but the averment of 
a conclusion and will not suffice; it presents 
BO issue for trial and is bad on demurrer." 
Goebel v. Gregg, 57 Cal. App. C51, 207 P. 
917, 018: "It is a general rule that a deed of 
gift is valid if the grantor was not indebted 
at the time he made it, "or if he had otlier 
means outside of the property conveyed with 
which to pay his indebtedness." There is an 
exception to this rule which "is based upon 
the fact that if the debtor secretly and with-
out the knowledge of one with whom he con-
tracts an indebtedness transfers his property 
without consideration, knowing that the cred-
itor in dealing with him relies upon his own-
ership thereof, it constitutes actual fraud, 
and upon a showing of such facts such trans-
fer may be annulled." 
Leavengood v. McGee, 50 Or. 233, 91 P. 453, 
456: There must be alleged and proven facts 
out of which a constructive fraud will arise 
by force of law, or facts constituting actual 
or expressed fraud. 'And the rule is that the 
facts upon which fraud is predicated must be 
specifically pleaded. A mere general aver-
ment of fraud is nothing but the averment of 
a conclusion, and will not suffice. I t presents 
no issue for trial, and is bad on demurrer. 
Such an averment not only renders the bill or 
complaint demurrable, but it will not even 
sustain a decree.' " Citing 20 Cyc. 734; Lea-
sure y. Forquer, 27 Or. 334, 41 P. 005. 
[7] It is not necessary to quote additional 
authority to support the principle. Where 
there is a valuable consideration or as the 
statute provides "a fair consideration," which 
is stated to be the fair equivalent therefor 
and not disproportionate to the value of the 
property conveyed the requirement as to alle-
gations and proof of fraud is more exacting. 
The complaint makes no distinction be-
tween the alleged creditors of the grantor 
whether subsequent or prior to the convey-
ances. Nor is it alleged the amount of in-
debtedness, nor the value of the land con-
veyed, nor the value of the assets remaining 
after the conveyances. The evidence shows 
that the claims of all of the creditors, except 
Smith and possibly one other, were claims 
that arose subsequent to the making of the 
conveyances. There is something said in ar-
gument as to another creditor being prior; 
but no distinction is made either in the al-
leged findings or decree. 
[8, 9] Whore the defendants, especially 
Lawrence Edwards and Elmer Edwards, were 
in possession, occupation, and use of the prop-
erty and paying taxes thereon in pursuance 
of a deed duly recorded, it is incumbent up-
on the plaintiffs to allege and prove that, as 
grantees, they did certain acts which misled 
the plaintiffs, or held themselves out in a way 
that misled plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs had 
knowledge and relied thereon. This aside 
from the question of consideration. As to 
claims arising after a conveyance is made 
and placed upon record, it is imperative that 
a creditor, before he can set a conveyance 
aside, must allege and prove that he was mis-
led by some overt act into believing some-
thing different from what the record showed, 
and of which he was bound at that time to 
take notice of the contents. 
There is a peculiar inconsistency of alle-
gation of the complaint when compared with 
the plaintiffs' theory of recovery. As to the 
plaintiff Thomas H. Crook it is alleged that 
the indebtedness was contracted upon the 
faith of defendant's (George H. Edwards) 
continued solvency, "and with the knowledge 
that he had long been solvent and the owner 
of said property." As to the plaintiff Wright, 
it is alleged that the indebtedness was con-
tracted upon the faith and because of the 
knowledge that said debtor had been solvent 
and was still the owner and apparent owner 
of the property conveyed, ^ l i s indebtedness 
was not contracted until May, 1022,.or more—^ 
*Than two years after the conveyances were^ 
placed of record in the recorder's office. As 
to the Kohler minors substantially the same 
allegations are made and yet the evidence , 
shows without contradiction that Mr. J. C. 
Jensen was the guardian of those same mi-
nors at the time he prepared the very de^ds 
sought to be set aside upon the ground of a 
belief that George II. Edwards was the own-
er. Besides Mr. Jensen was an abstracter 
and familiar with the records of Wasatch 
county. The record contradicted such 
"knowledge," and there is neither allegation 
nor proof that defendants said or did any-
thing inconsistent with the record notice. 
There is neither allegation nor proof that 
George II. Edwards made an affirmative 
statement to any person that he was the own-
er of the conveyed premises, that there was 
any affirmative act or conduct by which a 
creditor could be said to be thrown off his 
guard, or act, representation, or misrepre-
sentation by which a creditor was induced to 
extend credit upon reliance that he said he 
was the owner of the property either before or 
after the conveyances were made, or that El-
mer or Lawrence intimated they were not 
the owners as shown by the record. 
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;} As heretofore indicated, the plaintiffs 
, tli.,1 credit was extended upon the 
,.ML<» and l»i»li«»f that (leorge II. Ed-
,. w.i< Die owner of the conveyed prop-
If plaintiffs knew that he was the 
.- <,f the property, such knowledge must 
IMMII obtained from a source otlier than 
erty as shown by the state of the record. 
Some argue otherwise. Some aspects may he 
examined: (1) Was the conveyance itself 
the fraud? or (2) was it fraud because the 
conveyance purported to be voluntary or 
without consideration? or ('.)) did the convey-
ance produce discoverable insolvency at the 
,f Ccor.ue II. Edwards, or the other de- time it was made? If the conveyance. Jl,se|f 
,nis in so far as either allegation or_^ constituted the fraud, its recordation was 
notice of Its contents to all persons. 
[fl] The statutes and all the authorities 
agree that, if a fair consideration is given 
for the property or obligation, the trans-
action, contract, obligation, or conveyance 
may not be attacked because of the insolven-
cy or inability of the debtor to pay his obli-
gations. The authorities likewise hold that 
a fair consideration is given "when in ex-
change for such property, or obligation, as 
a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, 
property is conveyed or an antecedent debt 
is satisfied, or when such property, or obli-
gation is received in good faith to secure a 
present advance or antecedent debt in 
amount not disproportionately small as com-
pared with the value of the property or 
obligation obtained." Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, § 3. 
The conveyances attacked all contain the 
statement of consideration of "one dollar and 
other valuable considerations" and one 
of them contains in addition the statement 
that two of the tracts are each subject to a 
mortgage in the "sum of $1,000.00 which the 
grantee assumes and agrees to pay." 
[12] Under the statute from the time of 
filing the conveyance with the recorder it 
shall impart notice to all persons of the con-
tents thereof, grom. the time of recording > 
jhese conveyances ail persons, including^ 
plaintiirg, notice was imparted to them 
TTIe 
f,i,„,f is concerned. The undisputed evidence 
that Cicorge II. Edwards moved off the 
,,:,\.ycd tracts in June, 1921, about six 
ni.nihs after the recording of the eonvey-
;n.rs and that Lawrence and Elmer from the 
lime of the recording of the deeds were in ac-
tual occupation and use of the property. The 
«iiily other sources of information as to title 
in this property would be the records in the 
o:'iec of the county recorder of Wasatch 
county, or from some interested or disinter-
ested third persons. No information is 
tdiown to have originated from any source 
Mther than the record itself. In such case the 
burden is upon plaintiffs to show the infor-
maiion, and, if such information is material, 
it should be pleaded. 
The statute raises a presumption of notice, 
and, when plaintiffs allege they have knowl-
edge when the credit was extended, it is not 
easy to discover how such information could 
he theirs at the time of extending the credit 
itiid yet not be disclosed as found by the 
c.»urt till 1026 or about six years after the 
conveyances were made and recorded. 
The defendants pleaded that the causes of 
action are barred under the provisions of 
Ounp. Laws Utah 1917, § 4900, and subdivi-
M«.II 4, § 64G8. Section 4900 provides: 
"Kvery conveyance or instrument in writing 
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged, 
or proved, and certified in the manner pre-
Feribed by this title, * * * required by 
law to he recorded in the office of the county 
recorder, shall, from the time of filing the —„ • _ „ . , , 
suae with the recorder for record, impar tno—f^er Persons had ^ ^ ^ J ^ c ^ ^ ^ 
t ie to all persons of the contents thereof, 
conveyances contained TITO—stirtements 
Jove" quoted. That the nlainldis1 Uud aft1 
,v.d Subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and 
I!< dhiMers shall be deemed to purchase^aiid 
i?.\e with notice." 
Subdivision 4 of section 0108, Is as fol-
lows: "An action for relief on the ground 
of fraud or mistake, three years; the cause 
of action in such ease'not lo be Tleeiuod to 
have accrued until the discovery by the ag-
grieved party of the facts constituting the 
fraud or mistake." 
The parties agree the statute of limitations 
is three years. They divide on the question 
of inseovery. They approach the question 
differently. 
Some argue the recording of the deed im-
parts notice to all persons of the contents 
thereof and constitutes such notice as will 
Mart the statute of limitations running as to 
H »redder who may claim to be relying upon 
ances had been made and recorded seems*to 
go without saying, for surely, if one is 
charged with notice of^the contents, he must 
be charged with notice o£ the. existence of tlie 
document, itself»_ When the document couT 
tains a statement of facts indicating that 
litem was given for the property a fair con-
sideration when as a fact no consideration 
at all had been given, a very different situa-
tion is presented than a document showing 
on its face that there was no consideration 
or only a nominal consideration. Under such 
circumstances all persons would be entitled 
to rely upon and would have imparted to 
them the information contained in the con-
tents of the document, and until some in-
formation came to hand sufficient to put a 
reasonably prudent person upon inquiry he 
would be entitled} to rely upon the contents of 
the document. If may be argued that fraud 
in the first situation consisted of the false 
ownership, or implied ownership, pf prop- statement contained in the document, be-
-70 *rto?» 17 PACIFIC KKPOUTKU, 2d SERIES 
cause, no consideration passed and there is 
the false statement in the document that 
there was a valuable consideration. The 
fraud was committed at that: time but may 
'not be discoverable then. A creditor would 
not discover the falsity of the statement un-
til other information was brought to his at-
tention suthcienf to put him on inquiry. 
I [I3J In this case the contents of the con-
j Ycyanees were of record and imparted no-
! tice of the contents and what the consider:!-
I Hon was as shown thereby and all persons 
i might l)e expected to inquire forthwith of 
| what the "other valuable? considerations" 
I consisted, if the truthfulness was doubted 
I and failing to do so would cause the statute 
j to run from the time when a reasonably 
prudent person would have acted and there-
by discovered falsity if It existed. 
In the case of Stivens v. Summers, (J8 Ohio 
St. 421, 07 N. 10. 884, a father and mother 
conveyed lands to two of their sons, render-
ing the father insolvent while indebted. The 
(U^'ilH recited a good and valuable considera-
tion. Notes, however, were given payable to 
the administrator after the death of the 
surviving grantor. The court says: (page 
88G, of 67 N. E.) "Sine© the action could 
not be maintained but fqr the facts found 
respecting the financial condition of the 
grantor at the time of making the deeds, and 
since the record dicj not djsclose those facts, 
it cannot be said that the fraud was discover-
ed until the plaintiff, from a different source, 
received notice of such facts. A deed fraud-
ulent as tq creditors may recite the pay-
ment of a full and valuable consideration by 
the grantee, and an examination of the rec-
ord would not discJose to a creditor of the 
grantor that a cause of actjon has accrued in 
his favor." 
[|4] The citation just quoted and the one 
following indicate the difficulty which exists 
in suits of this character, T he difficulty aris-
es, not out of the enunciation of well set-
tled principles of law, but put of making ap-
plication of those'well settled principles to 
the facts and circumstance^ of the particular 
easp.j. Unless the notice refprred to in Comp. 
pXwws Utaji 1017, § 4000, means wljat it says 
I then one is loft to trace ouf from the uncer-
v f* * tainties of human activities, memories, and 
•Nsi { conflicting interests what the facts were. 
r Evidently the statute was intended to con-
; I stitqte notice of the contents of the recorded 
\ document, withoqt reference to place of resi-
l i e n c e or otherwise. 
Under bomp. £aws Utah 1017, § 0408, the 
provision is cjear tftat the limitation, does not 
begip to run nntjl the facts constituting the 
fraud are discovered. There is therefore a 
great deal said in the cases about what 
amounts JQ discovery, 
Chjnn V. Curtis (Ky.) 71 S. W. p23, 924. 
The evidence showed (hat the fatjier and son 
Jived together. There was no change of pos-
session. The son did not pay the taxes. 
The father was insolvent. The son paid $ loo 
to the father which was found to be inaile-
quale. As a part of the judgment the court 
held the conveyance should be set aside, hut 
the son was entitled to a lien against, the 
property for the .$100, and further held that 
"the recording of such conveyances is hn-
portant in establishing the time of the per-
petration of the fraud, but it throws little 
light, of itself, upon the question of discov-
ery. It is admissible evidence on that ques-
tion; and when the manner of its execution 
and registration, and other facts and cir-
cumstances in the case, would be suflicient to 
put a person of prudent mind upon inquiry, 
the law declares this to be notice, because 
he should have made the inquiry, and wil| be 
held to have done so, whether he did or not." 
The language of the Utah statute, Conip. 
Laws Utah 1017, § 0J0.H, subd. 4, upon pie 
provision referring to "discovery," contains 
the following language: "The cause of ne-
tion in such case not to be deemed to hjjve 
accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake." 
In the case of Duxbury v. Boice, 70 Minn. 
}13, 72 N. W. 838, 830, the Minnesota coijrt, 
Jn construing a statute in which the words, 
t'the discovery by the aggrieved party of the 
facts constituting the fraud" are discussed, 
proceeds to say: 
"The facts constituting the fraud were tjio 
conveyance by the debtor with intent to de-
fraud his creditors. When an action for re-
lief * * * is not commenced until more 
tjian six years after the commission of the 
acts constituting the fraud, the burden is 
qn the plaintiff to allege and prove that he 
<|id not discover the facts constituting tjie 
fraud. * * * The question is, what con-
stitutes a 'discovery' within the meaning i>t 
tjie statute? Mere constructive notice of the 
deed by reason of its being filed for record is 
i|pt notice of the facts constituting the fraud. 
* * * 
"To ascertain wha,t constitutes 'a discovery 
Of the facts constituting the fraud/ referenced 
ijpist be had to tjie principles of equity.'! 
* * * Itajce, in actions in equity, the rule I 
\yns that the iiie7in*s,pf'lvnowlC<lge were equip5* 
ajent to actmii kuowledgq;,4hat is, "thatS** 
knowledge of facts which would have put an 
ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry which, 
if followed up, woulu" have resulted in a din-
co,yjejwj^ fjMie fraud, was equivalent to actual 
fljscovery." 
The evidence discloses: The deeds were 
jnatfe and recorded Jn December, 1920. The 
deeds contained, among other things, the 
statement "for one dollar and other good and 
valuable considerations." At least one of th« 
(Jopds contained an agreement to assume and 
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T,;V two mortgages against the property oou-
VOVIM] in the sum of $1,000 each. There was 
a "change of possession within about six 
ninths after the conveyances. The property 
WJIS mortgaged'by the grantees. All of this 
Information could have been obtained readily 
Up,.n inquiry. No»Jnquiry_of any_ nature 
!.,--u\< to have been made. All parties bo-
t: ,1, .»s shown by the eVidence, that there 
,v:i- no financial diiliculty until the year 1023, 
to cause; either debtor or creditors to suspect 
i.uancial trouble or threatened insolvency. 
The evidence also indicates without serious 
ninflict that, after the conveyances were 
made, the grantor was worth, upon the esti-
mated values prevailing at that time, much 
tanrc than his indebtedness. Subsequent 
1< cs and depreciation account for insolven-
cy. One of the creditors testified that he 
probably had actual notice of the convey-
ances as early as 1923. 
The t r i a l voxirt held that the deed executed 
to Lawrence in 1019 was not fraudulent. The 
i!Iter deeds were executed and filed for ree-
. r.i in December, 1920. George II. Edwards 
a::<i his wife moved in the following June, 
r.'-l. out of the house on one of the tracts con-
v ycd, and Elmer and Lawrence moved into 
the house then vacated by their father and 
mother and remained in occupancy until the 
nine of bringing suit in 1927. The grantees 
j.a id the taxes, received the rents and profits, 
and were in open exclusive possession for 
snore than six years before the bringing of 
suit. None of these facts are seriously dis-
puted. There are some assumptions by some 
witnesses that George II. Edwards was in pos-
: es-ion, because he was occasionally seen up-
on some of the conveyed premises, or that 
some of the proceeds sold by the hoys were 
applied upon indebtedness of their father. 
There is not a word of testimony in the 
record that the defendant George II. Edwards 
made any representation to any creditor that 
he was or ever had been the owner of any of 
the lands in question other than what might 
arise hy implication out of a course of deal-
ing prior to the time of making the convey-
ances. No creditor or other person, so far as 
(he evidence discloses, asked George II. Ed-
wards, at the time, whether or not he was the 
owner of any of the lands in question at the 
time of incurring any of the indebtedness, nor 
afterward until some difficulty in collecting 
was experienced. The evidence seems to es-
tablish beyond question that George II. Ed-
wards regarded himself solvent at the time of 
making the conveyances, and for at least three 
years thereafter, and the evidence further dis-
closes that no one else seemed to suspect in-
solvency until after Edwards himself in 1923 
W>gan to realize that he was in financial dif-
ticutiies. 
The plaintiffs have attacked the alleged 
consideration for the conveyances. I t is not 
accessary to discuss the law relating to the 
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doctrine of consideration, what it takes to 
constitute «'i good and valuable consideration 
or the law relating to contracts between par-
ent and child, present, past, or future obliga-
tions. 
[15,161 An examination of the separate an-
swer of the defendant Lawrence Edwards and 
brielly summarized alleges: That about De-
cember, 1920, George II. Edwards owed Law-
rence $1,050 for wages under a specific agree-
ment. That Lawrence and his father entered 
into an agreement by the terms of which Law-
rence was to buy and his father was to sell to 
him the property in question for $10,000. 
That the $-1,650 was credited to Lawrence up-
on the obligation and that the father took a 
note for $5,350, payable in two years at 6 per 
cent, interest. That in 1921 Lawrence bor-
rowed from the state of Utah $2,500 and gave 
a mortgage upon the land in question and 
paid $2,450 upon the note. That Lawrence 
also borrowed from a bank (naming it) $1,000 
and pledged certain personal property and 
paid that amount upon the note. This note 
to the bank was unpaid at the time of trial. 
These allegations in the answer of Lawrence 
Edwards were all proved by the testimony of 
both Lawrence and his father. None of it 
was seriously questioned by plaintiffs except 
that part relating to the agreement for serv-
ices between father and son and the amounts. 
That there was such an agreement is not dis-
puted by any competent evidence. Both fa-
ther and son testify to it. No one denies it. 
That Lawrence worked for his father during 
the period stated is not questioned or dis-
puted. There are some discrepancies between 
the total amount alleged and the amount that 
would result from the calculation of the 
monthly schedule and deducting such sums as 
may have been drawn. Because there were 
some discrepancies in amounts, would not jus-
tify the disallowance of the whole amount un-
less the court was of opinion that there was 
no contract, or upon a quantum meruit for 
services there was nothing due. Certainly, 
under the evidence, the services claimed to 
have been were rendered. The court should 
have determined the amount due if there was 
a question as to that and if the amount due 
for services less the amounts paid plus the 
amounts subsequently paid on the alleged pur-
chase price failed of a fair consideration, set 
aside the conveyances and subject the premis-
es to a lien for the amount paid in good faith 
upon the transaction, 
[17,18] This being an equity proceeding 
this court may review questions of both law 
and fact. I t is established that, in reaching 
conclusions as to facts, the findings made by 
the trial court should not be disturbed unless 
we are convinced that they are wrong, but, 
when so convinced, it becomes our duty to set 
them aside. Paxton v. Paxton (Utah) 15 P. 
(2d) 1051. 
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K\<vpf, (ov the discrepancies referred to, 
there seems no reason to doubt (lie truthful-
ness of I he testimony of tlie grantees, eertniu-
ly not sufficient to justify the conclusion that 
their whole testimony was so tinctured with 
perjury as to justify the rejection of it in toto. 
In fact most of the evidence in tin? record 
whether for or against either party came 
[from (Joorgo II. Kdwards and his two sons. 
We see no good reason in the light of the 
whole record why their testimony should he 
accepted as to certain matters and rejected as 
to others, except where they were properly 
impeached, or such discrepancies existed as 
to particular matters as to require' its rejec-
tion upon those matters. 
What has been said with reference to the 
answer and proof of Lawrence Kdwards, ap-
plies substantially, except as to amounts, dif-
ference of property, age, etc., to Elmer Ed-
wards, and it would serve no good purpose 
to refer to the testimony, and elements of the 
situation in detail. Values vary with time, 
place, conditions, and circumstances, and are 
largely matters of opinion. This is especially 
true as to lands, live stock, range rights, and 
other varieties of property. 
[19] The testimony in this case was permit-
ted to take a very wide range. Most of the 
testimony refers to matters long after it could 
throw any light upon the issues in the case. 
It may be easy to show insolvency seven years 
after a transaction. The question is not the 
financial condition so long""after"THit whaf 
was it at . the tinie. Td'TI'ustrateX. Oiuf 6F 
~tho.items, though small, did not arise between*"* 
"George U Ed wa rds and" acreditor until 1826, 
or six years after the conveyances. Not the 
slightest suspicion of either actual or con-
structive fraud could have entered into the 
matter at the time. 
In matters of this kind considerable lati-
tude is usually granted by a trial court. The 
character of the case makes this necessary. 
The record was unnecessarily extended by the 
admission of much testimony so far remote 
as to b:* of no value in throwing any light up-
on the transactions which took place in 1020, 
or the financial condition of George II. Ed-
wards at that time. 
""*' [20, 21] Wo are of the opinion that the ac-
tion jshnj;n>rTTTn^"r the statute of limitations 
•orthe'^reiisTm that discovery was made, or 
the situation was such as to furnish full op-
jpTiTuuity for the dT?cTm»t,y uf TrMTTuTif any_ 
Twisted, more than tliree years he fore the 
ILT of the action. Wo arc 
valuable consideration, If not nn adequate 
one, for the conveyances. Part of it tin? can-
cellation of an Obligation, past, present, or 
closely subsequent to the time of the convey-
ance. It is not necessary in the light of what 
has been said to discuss the* many errors as-
signed, especially those? as to the findings ami 
conclusions. This opinion suflicieutly indi-
cates that the judgment should have been for 
the defendants, and that the action should 
have been dismissed. 
Because of the errors referred to the judg-
ment of the trial court is reversed, and the 
cause remanded with directions to dismiss the 
action. Appellants to recover costs. 
CHERRY, C. J., and STRAUP, FOLIAND, 
and EPHRAIM HANSON, JJ., concur. 
ELIAS HANSEN, J., being disqualified, did 
not participate herein* 
NELSON v. LOTT. 
No. 5268. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 28, 1932. 
ly on the part of tlfe grantees, "and not suf-
ficient on the part of the grantor to justify the 
setting aside of the conveyances. There was 
no proof of insolvency at the time the con-
veyances were made or for about three years 
1. Appeal and error <&=>I064(I). 
Instruction respecting giving of warning 
by motorist striking pedestrian held prejudi-
cially erroneous because warranting finding 
of negligence if defendant failed to sound 
horn regardless of necessity therefor. 
Instruction was in substance that if jury 
found plaintiff was standing in lane and 
that defendant drove automobile in direc-
tion of plaintiff and upon him, and in so 
doing failed and neglected to so operate 
automobile as to avoid striking plaintiff, 
or failed and neglected to sound horn or 
give any warning of approach, and that no 
warning of approach was given, and if 
jury should further find that such negli-
gence, if any, was direct and proximate 
cause of injury, and that plaintiff exer-
cised reasonable care for his own safety, 
jury should return verdict for plaintiff, 
2. Automobiles C=>I5I. 
Motorist's failure to give warning does 
not constitute negligence where there is no 
apparent necessity for warning and obliga-
tion to give signal is not imposed under cir-
cumstances by statute (Laws 1921, c. 83, p. 
234, § 397S). 
3. Automobiles <§=»245(6). 
Whether ordinary care required motorist 
( thereafter. There was, to say the least, a striking pedestrian standing in lane leacjin 
(§=>For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexes 
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